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In the last several years, paraconsistent mereology has begun to be developed and applied to
a range of philosophical issues, from puzzles about boundaries [13], to the Meinongian ‘problem of
nothingness’ [1, 2, 10], to the metaphysics of unity [9]. Because these formal systems are fresh out
of the package, as it were, there will inevitably be some wrinkles that need ironing out. In this
note, I’ll point out a problem with the systems in Priest [9, 10], and suggest a way to fix them.
Priest’s [10] mereology uses the proper parthood relation as its primitive, symbolized by <. He
defines the parthood relation ≤ using the standard definition: x ≤ y :≡ x < y ∨ x = y; he also
defines mereological overlap ◦ as x ◦ y :≡ ∃z(z ≤ x ∧ z ≤ y).1 Here are his axioms:
(1) ∀x∀y(x < y → ¬y < x) Asymmetry
(2) ∀x∀y((x < y ∧ y < z)→ x < z) Transitivity
(3) ∀x∀y(∀z(z ◦ x↔ z ◦ y)→ x = y) Extensionality
(4) ∀X∃y∀z(z ◦ y ↔ ∃x(x ∈ X ∧ z ◦ x)) Unrestricted Fusion
The first two axioms state that proper parthood is a strict ordering on the domain; these are
principles Priest accepts as “a standard assumption (that I will not challenge here)” [10, p. 148].
The next axiom is that objects are extensionally defined via their overlappers; and the final is an
unrestricted principle of fusion based on a definition from Goodman [5].2
1Priest uses E and A for quantifiers instead of ∃ and ∀, as he is working in a Meinongian framework with neutral
quantification. For our purposes, however, the difference makes little difference.
2Strictly speaking, Priest [10] is only committed to there being fusions for every set, not the existence of such a
fusion.
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A similar system is found in Priest [9, ch. 6], except that there Priest rejects Asymmetry and
its correlate Antisymmetry.
(5) ∀x∀y((x ≤ y ∧ y ≤ x)→ x = y) Antisymmetry
The rejection of (5) is crucial to Priest’s metaphysics of unity, due to a substitution argument
involving ‘prime gluons’ (p. 89).
But the problem is that (5) is entailed by (2) and (3).3 Assume x ≤ y and y ≤ x. From the
former, it actually follows that ∀z(z ◦ x→ z ◦ y): for assume z ◦ x i.e. ∃w(w ≤ z ∧ w ≤ x); by (2),
w ≤ y and so z ◦ y. Similarly from y ≤ x we have ∀z(z ◦ y → z ◦ x), and so ∀z(z ◦ x↔ z ◦ y). By
(3), x = y.
This means, crucially, that in order for Priest’s systems to undergird the applications in [9], (3)
must go. Perhaps, then, Priest can treat this ‘problem’ as simply a sound argument for rejecting
(3). Problem solved?
Not exactly. For once (3) is rejected, a whole new range of problems crop up, particularly to









Figure 1: Bad fusions
Look first at the diagram on the left of figure 1, which displays a model in which everything
overlaps everything; in particular, something overlaps c if and only if it overlaps either a or b.
Counterintuitively, then, this means that c is a fusion of {a, b}. Oddly, though, c isn’t even an
upper bound of a and b; it doesn’t even have a or b as parts! Another case in point is the non-
3Here I assume the underlying paraconsistent logic is such that → detaches, as it does in BX (see Priest [10, fn.
16]). If one is using a non-detachable conditional, such as the material conditional of LP , then all the axioms of the
theory — especially (4) — are much weaker that one would have hoped (see Priest [10, §8]).
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extensional model on the right, where a turns out to be fusion of {a, b} even though b is not part of
a (and vice versa). This shows clearly that things can go badly wrong with the definition fusions
in such non-extensional models.
What to do? There are a number of options. We could mess around with the definition of
fusions. Here are three prominent definitions of fusions found in the literature.
(6) FXz :≡ ∀x(x ∈ X → x ≤ z) ∧ ∀y(∀x(x ∈ X → x ≤ y)→ z ≤ y) Algebraic Fusions
(7) F ′Xz :≡ ∀x(x ∈ X → x ≤ z) ∧ ∀y(y ≤ z → ∃x(x ∈ X ∧ y ◦ x)) Les´niewski Fusions
(8) F ′′Xz :≡ ∀y(y ◦ z ↔ ∃x(x ∈ X ∧ y ◦ x)) Goodman Fusions
Priest relies on (8), but he might have more success with either (6) which is used in [13] and
subsequently in [1, ch. 4] and [2, 3]. Alternatively, he might try the historic (7) used [6], [11], and
popularized by [8].4
But instead of pursuing other definitions of fusion, a simpler fix would be to recover some
missing structure by adding an axiom that falls just short of extensionality.
(9) ∀x∀y(∀z(z ◦ x→ z ◦ y)→ x ≤ y) Strong Supplementation
This principle is one of a family of so-called Supplementation principles, which forces objects to
be decomposed in intuitive ways. It is easy to see that this principle eliminates the problem with
the above models, since it requires that whenever x’s overlappers includes y’s overlappers, then x
includes y. A fusion, then, will always be an upper bound of the things it fuses.
I say that (9) ‘falls just short of extensionality’ because when x and y have the same overlappers,
it follows that x ≤ y and y ≤ x. However, the inference to x = y is blocked because we don’t in
general have (5).
To sum up, the mereology given in Priest [9] is inadequate for his purposes, due to the presence
of antisymmetry and extensionality. But a good fix is not too far away.
4For more on the various definitions of fusion in non-antisymmetric (albeit classical) contexts, see [4].
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